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13 February 1954

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
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GENERAL

1. Britain offers qualified approval of proposed Turkish-Pakistani agreement:


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According to a Turkish Foreign Ministry official, a British note delivered on 10 February stated that Britain "welcomed" Turkey's and Pakistan's initiative in their proposed defense cooperation agreement, but added that no effective Middle East defense organization could be established without British cooperation.

The British hoped that the proposed pact would lead to greater Pakistani interest in the Middle East. They urged that public announcement of the pact be phrased to avoid alarming other Middle East countries or "distressing" India unduly.

Comment: The note reiterates Britain's consistent position that it should be fully consulted on any future developments.



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FAR EAST

3. Taipei believes Rhee's sponsorship of Magsaysay premature:
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 President Chiang Kai-shek and Foreign Minister Yeh are irritated over President Rhee's attempts to use Magsaysay in connection with his "anti-Communist projects," according to Ambassador Briggs. While the Nationalists are interested in having the Philippines assume a major role in an anti-Communist pact, they believe that Rhee's promotion of Magsaysay is premature.

Although the foreign minister did not commit himself on Japan's participation in the pact, he described Rhee's behavior toward Japan as "irresponsible."

Comment: South Korean foreign minister Pyun has publicly suggested that Magsaysay assume the leadership of an anti-Communist alliance composed of the Philippines, Formosa, Thailand, Indochina and South Korea. By sponsoring Magsaysay, Rhee apparently hopes to gain greater American support for the proposal.


American officials in the Far East agree that while Magsaysay's potential for leadership is considerable, his position in the area would be weakened by close association with Rhee and Chiang. They believe that as long as South Korea maintains its hostile attitude toward Japan, there is little chance for an effective Asian anti-Communist front.


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25X1 4. Sino-Indian talks on Tibet reportedly make little progress:




Comment:  the only agreement yet reached after six weeks of negotiation is on a subject not covered by formal treaty. It is unlikely, however, that the Chinese have not raised the sensitive issues of border demarcation or the position of Indian troops in Tibet. It seems that India's main effort has been to resist a Chinese endeavor to gain an official foothold immediately south of the Himalayas. India is in a weak position with respect to Tibet and may in the long run be forced to yield to Chinese demands.

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EASTERN EUROPE

25X1A 5. East German uprising not expected:



American observers in Berlin now believe that while isolated protest actions in East Germany are possible during and after the four-power conference, uprisings of the size and duration of the 17 June demonstrations are improbable.

American press reports of imminent "open rebellion" are not supported by the available evidence. The East Germans' own knowledge of the Soviet and local military forces and of the widely publicized repressive measures since 17 June will probably dissuade them from coordinated demonstrations.

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Comment: These observations support
previous information that East German discontent has remained
latent.

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